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Factor-Augmented VAR Analysis of the Monetary Policy in China 
Abstract: 
We investigate the effects of monetary policy in China over the past two decades with 
emphasis on the post-Asian crisis period and the more recent currency regime shift. A 
factor-augmented VAR method is used to study the effectiveness of monetary policy 
instruments in stabilizing the Chinese economy. We find that repo rate, benchmark 
lending rate, and a market-based monetary stance are mildly effective, whereas 
growth rates of total loan and money supply are significantly effective. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of market-based monetary policies does not improve under a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. We conclude that the central bank in China still 
depends on administrative instruments in stabilizing domestic inflation to maintain 
macroeconomic and financial stability. 
KEYWORDS: Factor model, Principal components, VAR, Monetary policy 














In the post-Asian crisis period, China has achieved remarkable economic growth in 
more than a decade, with an average annual growth rate of about nine percent. 
Meanwhile, the inflation rate, measured by the GDP deflator or CPI, has remained 
moderate. I With the termination of official guidance on bank lending operations in 
1998, monetary policy has played an increasing role in the macroeconomic 
stabilization in China (Green, 2005). However, the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy remains unclear. Since 1998, a variety of monetary policy 
instruments, such as base interest rates, open market operation, discount rate, and 
reserves requirement, have been adopted by the People's Bank of China (PBC) in 
fine-tuning the economy. Nevertheless, how monetary policy affects the real economy 
is still unclear as the relationship between these instruments and actual economic 
activities are unstable over time. With the integration into the global economy, the 
independence and effectiveness of China's monetary policy have been challenged 
because of the rigidity imposed on the exchange rate.^ As a result, increasing 
attention has been focused on the effects and mechanisms of the Chinese monetary 
policy. 3 
In an attempt to shed light on the transmission channels of monetary policy in China, 
we employ a new methodology~the factor-augmented vector autoregression 
(FAVAR)~to investigate the effects of several important monetary policy instruments 
I The inflation rate remains below 3 percent in most periods. Several studies have found that the 
Chinese economy has experienced a substantial moderation [Brandt and Zhu (2002) and He et al. 
(2009)] 
-Goodfriend and Prasad (2007) reported that the Chinese monetary policy has operated under difficult 
constraints. 
3 For instance, in response to the reduction of exports caused by the subprime crisis, the PBC reduced 
the lending rate and the required reserve ratio to support financially distressed industries. 
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during the last decade.4 The FAVAR approach enables us to assess how much of the 
observed movements of real economies can be attributed to each policy instrument, 
separately and in combination. 
Although significant efforts have been devoted to investigating the effect of Chinese 
monetary policies, most of the previous studies analyzed only a single policy 
instrument (Mehrotra, 2007; Dickinson and Liu, 2007; Koivu, 2009). Our study 
complements efforts from previous literature by making a comprehensive 
investigation of different monetary policy instruments in China. By comparing the 
role of each instrument, we obtain insight into the transmission mechanism of the 
Chinese monetary policy. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use a 
combination of policy instruments in model estimation. As China usually implements 
different market-based policy instruments simultaneously, the factor approach may 
provide an overall evaluation of its monetary policy. Most of the previous studies 
have employed VAR, which typically comprises few variables. The use of sparse 
information sets in VAR analysis may produce inaccurate estimates and impulse 
response pattern (Sims, 1992; Rudebusch, 1998; Bemanke et al., 2005). The FAVAR 
model combines the standard VAR approach with factor analysis, and can provide 
proper identification of the monetary transmission mechanism (Stock and Watson, 
1998; Bemanke et a l , 2005; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006). 
Our results suggest that the Chinese economy is affected primarily by the growth rate 
of total loan and M2. Other market policy instruments, such as repo and benchmark 
lending rates, are only mildly effective in influencing the economy. We also show that 
4 The FAVAR procedure has been widely used in the analysis of U.S. and European monetary 
policies. 
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the general monetary stance representing the overall effects of market-based 
instruments only plays a modest role in curbing inflation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
major monetary policies and the transmission mechanism in China. The FAVAR 
method is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical evidence. Section 
5 presents the results and policy implications, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Features of Post-Crisis Chinese Monetary Policy 
The PBC has become the central bank of China since 1983 and it operates under the 
control of the State Council. An approach of "direct lending" is widely used in 
implementing monetary policy. Although a number of reforms have been promulgated 
in the following years (The PBC, 2005), the lending pattern had few changes up to 
1998 (Park and Sehrt, 2001), indicating negligible changes in the implementation of 
monetary policy. 
The Chinese economy is exposed to more external economic uncertainties; thus, an 
independent and effective monetary policy is increasingly crucial for stabilizing 
inflation, employment, and economic growth (Goodfriend and Prasad, 2007).^ Along 
with liberation and reform in the banking sector, a series of reforms have been carried 
out to enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Since the termination of 
"direct lending" in 1998, a variety of monetary instruments have been implemented. 
This section briefly reviews some liberalization policies and a number of policy 
5 For instance, Lardy (2005) points out that the lack of independence of the PBC may result in 
counterproductive monetary policy, which leads to a further delay in liberalizing the capital account. 
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instruments that have become important since 1998. 
2.1. Liberalization of China's monetary policy in recent years 
The PBC has a dual legal mandate of "maintaining the stability of the currency, and 
thereby promoting economic growth". However, the persistent double-digit inflation 
rate in the first half of the 1990s and the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997，cast doubt on the prospects of the Chinese economy. A series of banking and 
financial reforms, especially liberalization policies, has strengthened China's 
monetary policy. In 1996 and 1997，the upper limits on inter-bank lending rate were 
abolished, and the bond repo interest rates were liberalized, implying less 
administrative control over the money market. More importantly, the credit quota 
control was scrapped in 1998 and the central bank was able to conduct its monetary 
policy through indirect tools. The PBC further liberalized the interest rates to improve 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Since then, the ceiling of RMB lending rate of 
financial institutions has climbed until it was finally abolished in 2004 (except for the 
Urban Credit Cooperatives and Rural Credit Cooperatives). The floor of the deposit 
rate was also removed in 2004. The lending rate began to move unboundedly from 90 
percent of the benchmark lending rate，whereas the ceiling on deposit rate continued 
to prevail. In 2007，the Shanghai Inter-bank Offered Rate was formally launched to 
strengthen the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy (The PBC, 2007). 
2.2. Monetary policy instruments and their transmission mechanisms 
Since 1998, the PBC has been compelled to update its monetary tool box to increase 
the effectiveness of policy reaction as a consequence of economic environment 
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change. Aside from the administrative instruments, reform toward market-based 
instruments has also been implemented. ^ The following section briefly reviews 
several important monetary instruments used by the PBC. 
A. Open market operation 
Open market operation is a major monetary policy used by the PBC to influence the 
money market interest rate and the money supply.^ Because open market operation is 
carried out on a repo basis, the repo rate is often used as an indicator of China's 
monetary policy^ (Peng et a l , 2006). Figure 1 shows that the repo rate declined from 
8.6 percent in 1998 to barely 1 percent in 2005. This rate has been climbing since 
2005, curbing the overheating economy and the escalating inflation. The decline of 
the repo rate in 2008 provided extensive liquidity for the economy. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
B. Benchmark lending interest rate 
The benchmark interest rate is the reference rate set by the PBC, around which 
different financial institutions can set their respective commercial lending rates. As 
the restrictions of the benchmark interest rate were gradually removed, financial 
6 Market-based instruments include open market operation, central bank lending rate, rediscount rate, 
required reserve interest rate, excess reserve interest rate, required reserve ratio, and benchmark 
lending and deposit rate. Administrative instruments are the regulatory change and window guidance, 
which is a quantitative manipulation of bank credit. 
7 When the pressure of inflation increases, the PBC can sell central bank bills on a cash or repo basis 
in the money market and withdraw money from commercial banks. With less capital available for 
lending, banks have to raise the lending rate to reflect the real price of capital. The drop in demand for 
loans will also lower consumption, investment, and aggregate demands. Consequently, the pressure of 
inflation will be relieved. For instance, the issuance of central bank bills in 2008 has decreased 
gradually to ensure an ample money supply in the market during the global financial crisis. 
The 7-day repo rate is often used as a benchmark (Green, 2005) 
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institutions were allowed to set their own interest rates according to market 
conditions. 
The benchmark interest rate is a key market-based monetary policy for adjusting the 
broad money supply. Figure 2 shows that the one-year benchmark lending rate has 
declined substantially during 1998 and 1999, and remained at around 2 percent until 
early 2007. The rate climbed to four percent in 2008 and was reduced again in 2009 to 
enable the stimulation monetary policy to cope with the subprime crisis. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
C. Total loan 
The total amount of credit provided by financial institutions to the economy can be 
adjusted by the central bank in various ways. The PBC can employ market-based 
instruments, such as interest rates or required reserve ratio, to indirectly control total 
credit. Although the credit quota was eliminated in 1998, window guidance^ is still 
crucial for managing the total amount of credit. 
As window guidance and regulation changes are not quantifiable, the general 
monetary direction can be elucidated by tracking the total amount of credit growth. 
Figure 3a shows that the growth of financial institution loan has risen from 5 percent 
in the early 2000s to 15 percent in the mid-2000s. The central bank accelerated the 
9 Window guidance is another policy controlling the amount of bank credit and the M2 without going 
through the money market and affecting the interest rate. This instrument can also be treated as a 
measure for promoting certain types of industries. For instance, commercial banks may be instructed to 
refrain from lending to industries with high energy consumption, and reinforce support for the 
agricultural sector. Furthermore, to ease the upward pressure of the currency, the PBC has to keep the 
interest rates in China significantly lower than those in the United States. The PBC thus employs 
window guidance to control money supply when other monetary instruments are not feasible (Lardy, 
2005). 
16 
credit creation after 2008，indicating a loosening of monetary policy upon the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
D. Money supply (M2) 
Broad money supply, or M2, is the intermediate target of the monetary policy of the 
PBC, and the bank's annual target growth rate of M2 is usually announced at the 
beginning of the year. The PBC tends to use both market-based and administrative 
monetary tools to achieve the M2 ta rge t .� Figure 3 shows that the annual growth rate 
of money supply fluctuated around 15 percent between 1998 and 2007. This growth 
rate increased substantially to over 25 percent in 2009. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
2.3. Exchange rate reform and monetary policy 
The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, was actually pegged to the US dollar before July 
2005." The rigidity of the exchange rate has limited the capacity of the PBC in 
controlling price level and growth rate via its monetary policy (Prasad et al., 2005). 
On 21 July 2005, the PBC promulgated reforms in its exchange rate policy by 
allowing Renminbi to float in a managed way with reference to a basket of 
Although M2 and total loans capture the effects of most policy instruments, their growth targets are 
determined separately and their actual growth rates do not necessarily coincide. We consider both 
indicators to gauge the general monetary stance in China. 
11 Although the PBC has announced that the exchange rate was allowed to move around the parity by 
0.3 percent, the official rate seldom deviates from the fixed parity. 
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currencies. 12 Figure 4 shows that the exchange rate between RMB and the US dollar 
climbed from 8.28 in July 2005 to 6.83 in February 2010. The reform in the exchange 
rate policy provided the PBC with more flexibility in managing the economy via its 
monetary policy. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
2.4. Effects of monetary policy on industrial production and inflation 
The Chinese economy was characterized by high inflation during the first half of the 
1990s. Between 1993 and 1995，there was a huge build-up of price pressure in the 
domestic market with the consumer price index rising to 27 percent in October 1994. 
Monetary authorities tightened administrative policies in 1993 and finally brought the 
inflation rate down to a single digit in 1996. 
The sustainability of economic growth became a big concern for Chinese authorities 
in the second half of the 1990s when the Renminbi remained fixed against the US 
dollar, as many Asian countries experienced depreciated currencies. Figure 6 shows 
that China lost its export competitiveness because the growth of industrial production 
has been slowing down since the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s . T h e consumer price index (Figure 5) 
fell from its peak in 1994 to nearly zero in 1998. Given the relatively low inflation 
rate, the PBC was able to relax its monetary policy to stimulate the economy. From 
1998, the repo rate has been cut from 8.6 percent to below 3 percent in 2000, and the 
12 The intra-day variation of the Renminbi exchange rate against the US dollar was within 0.3 percent. 
This band was widened to 0.5 percent in May 2007. 
13 The average growth rate between 1994 and 1996 was 17.5, whereas it was a mere 10.9 percent 
between 1997 and 1999. Such a low rate of industrial growth was partly due to the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. 
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benchmark interest rate fell from 5.7 percent to 2.25 percent in 1999. These drastic 
measures, coupled with window guidance, helped increase the money supply growth, 
warding off the potential downturn in industrial output. 
Between 1999 and 2003, the price level mildly dropped because of strong 
productivity growth. To ease the deflationary pressure, the central bank cut its interest 
rates and increased the money supply. The broad money growth rose from 14 percent 
in 2000 to 20 percent in 2003. On account of this relaxed monetary environment in 
2000-2003, the growth rate of industrial production has rebounded to 16.2 percent 
from its trough in 2000, while the consumer price index has steadily climbed since 
2004. The overheating economy alerted the monetary authorities. To rein in asset 
prices and the overheating economy, the PBC tightened its monetary stance by raising 
interest rates as well as setting a higher reserve ratio for commercial banks. 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 triggered by the US subprime mortgage 
market, however, has reversed the contractionary monetary stance. The worsening 
economic environment of industrial countries adversely affected industrial production 
in China. The growth rate of industrial production plunged from more than 15 percent 
in early 2008 to merely 5 percent in December 2008. Fear of high inflation vanished 
as the consumer price index dipped into the negative in 2009. In addition to the 
government's fiscal stimulation, the PBC cut its interest rates and increased financial 
loans to sustain the 8 percent economic growth target. The repo rate was cut from 
more than 3 percent in late 2008 to less than 1 percent in early 2009, whereas the 
growth rate of broad money supply rose to nearly 30 percent in late 2009 from only 
15 percent in 2008. 
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[Insert Figure 6 here] 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Estimation Framework 
Although the VAR approach is widely employed to estimate the effect and efficiency 
of monetary policy, it suffers from relatively sparse information because of the 
low-dimensional VARs. To conserve the degrees of freedom, no more than six 
variables are normally used in VAR analysis. To control the estimation bias caused by 
the sparse information, we considered a large-dimensional dynamic factor model in 
this paper. The model extracts a few latent factors from a large pool of observed data 
series which are plausibly used by the central bank (Stock and Watson, 2002a, 2002b; 
Favero et al., 2004; Fomi et al., 2005; Breitung and Eickmeier, 2006). 
Our model is based on FAVAR (Bemanke, Boivin, and Eliasz，2005). Similar to the 
standard VAR, this model defines a transition equation (1) which captures the 
transition mechanism of the economy. 
( 1 ) 旧 + v, 
L V i � 
In the transition equation, Y, is an M x l vector of observable economic variables 
assumed to drive the dynamics of the economy, such as industrial production, interest 
rates, and consumer price index, ^t is a K x l vector of unobservable factors, which 
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is supposed to capture the theoretical concept of "real economic activity", "price 
pressures", or "financial market conditions". If there is no factor in the transition 
equation, FAVAR is reduced to the standard VAR with only observable economic 
variables, implying that the standard VAR is a sub-model of FAVAR. To conserve the 
degree of freedom and include the information set of the monetary authority, we 
augment the VAR with several factors, which summarize a large number of data series. 
The vector of factor Ft is extracted from the observation equation (2) below. 
(2) X,=A'F,+A:'Y,+e, 
In Equation (2), is an N x l vector of observable informational time series, 
where N is large relative to the sum of M and K (i.e., N » M + K). The matrix 八厂 
and A-'' are the factor loadings of dimension conformable to X � F , , and ^ . The 
error terms 己/ are assumed to have a zero mean. This observation equation implies 
that the dimension of the entire information set in ^ t , which cannot be spanned by 
y,, is spanned by the factors. In this study, we estimate the factors with a two-step 
principal components approach''^ to extract the factors. In addition, by implementing 
a bootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998) which accounts for factor estimation 
uncertainty, we could obtain more accurate standard error bands on the impulse 
response functions in the estimations. 
3.2. Identification 
After stating the framework, the FAVAR model could not be estimated 
The program we employed in the estimation is based on Bemanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). 
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econometrically without a set of restrictions. In particular, we need to specify 
restrictions needed to identify the factors and the respective loadings. Following 
Bemanke et al. (2005), we estimate the econometric model in two steps by principal 
components and obtain all the factors entirely from the observation equation. First, we 
impose normalization restriction, which is standard in principal component analysis, 
by taking c ' c / r = /，where C is the space spanned by the factors estimated using the 
first K + M principal components of x . This implies that c = Vrz , where z are the 
eigenvectors corresponding to the K largest eigenvalues of xx ' . 
4. Data Description 
Our samples consists of 100 monthly data series (1998M1-2010M2), and are 
categorized into 12 groups.'^ The first 11 groups focus on different aspects of 
economic performance in China, including real activities, price index, investment, 
government revenue and expenditure, retail sales, international trade, interest rate, 
money aggregate, financial market, exchange rate, and consumer index. With the 
integration into the world economy, China is inevitably exposed to worldwide 
economic uncertainties, especially those of the United States. Thus, the US data were 
also included. 
The data which are conceived to have seasonality are first adjusted by X-12 ARIMA. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is employed to test the stationarity of the data 
series. In case of non-stationarity, the series is transformed by first log difference to 
attain stationarity. Following Bemank, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), we distinguish two 
categories of data series in this paper, namely, fast-moving and slow-moving data. 
15 A detailed description of each data series is presented in the appendix. 
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Fast moving data, such as interest rates, monetary aggregates, asset prices, exchange 
rate, and consumer indexes, are contemporaneously affected by monetary shock. Slow 
moving data, including the data of real activity, price level, and international trade, are 
affected by monetary shock for a lag of one period. 
5. Empirical Results 
We estimate a FAVAR model with a number of frequently employed policy 
instruments, namely repo rate, benchmark lending rate, total financial institution loans, 
and M2, to evaluate their respective effectiveness. In addition, because the PBC 
typically uses several market-based instruments simultaneously to achieve its 
objectives, we also use a factor that tracks a wide range of market-based policy 
instruments at the disposal of the PBC, to represent a general stance of the monetary 
policy. By estimating FAVAR with this policy factor, we observe the effects on the 
economy from a sudden change (which is a 25-basis-point innovation for the policy 
instrument) of the market-based monetary stance. For each of the five models, we 
solely include the policy instrument in Y,, augment VAR with three factors and utilize 
all the other data series in the vector 
The exchange rate policy has undergone substantial reform since 2005. To evaluate 
the change in effectiveness under this reform, we estimate the models with two 
different subsamples, which are January 1998—June 2005 and September 
2002—February 2010'^. The first subsample covers the period before the exchange rate 
16 Following Bemanke, Boivin, and Eliazs (2005), we used FAVAR with three factors and one policy 
instrument as the baseline model. Stock and Watson (1999’ 2002b) also showed that a few, perhaps two, 
dynamic factors account for a large amount of variation in the macroeconomic data series. 
17 The reasons to set the second sample between September 2002 and February 2010 are to maintain 
the equal number of observations in the two samples and to ensure an enough number of observations 
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reform, whereas the second subsample covers the period under a more flexible 
currency regime. By comparing the performance of monetary policy in the two 
subsample periods, the evolution of monetary policy due to relaxed control over the 
exchange rate can be elucidated. To understand the effects of shock from monetary 
policy on the economy, we also present the impulse response function for a wide 
range of economic indicators along with the industrial output and consumer price 
level. 
5.1. Estimation of FAVAR with repo rate as instrument 
First, we estimate the model with repo rate as the policy instrument. Figure 8 displays 
the resulting impulse response functions generated by FAVAR before the exchange 
rate reform given an increase in the repo rate. The response of the industrial 
production is insignificant.'^ The consumer price index initially exhibits a moderate 
increase, then falls after a few months. Real estate investment also declines for an 
extended period of time. Consequently, the repo rate is ineffective in promoting 
economic growth and weak at maintaining the price level under the fixed exchange 
rate. 
Figure 9 shows the impulse response function generated by FAVAR from September 
2002—February 2010. Given a positive shock in repo rate, the industrial production 
gradually declines a few months after the shock, whereas the consumer price index 
rises for 15 months, displaying a sign of price puzzle. In comparison with the 
for drawing reliable results. Though the result is easier to interpret, it is not possible to get reliable 
results if the second samples starts from July 2005. 
18 For the figures showing the results (Figures 8—11, 14-19), the green line shows the point estimate of 
the response function. The light blue line and the red line represent the 90 percent upper and lower 
confidence level, respectively. 
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response under a fixed exchange rate, the repo rate is more capable of stimulating real 
economic performance, but may not be an effective tool in containing inflation, 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
5.2. Estimation of FAVAR with benchmark lending rate as instrument 
In the second model, we estimate the response of industrial production and inflation 
from a positive shock in the benchmark lending rate. Figure 10 depicts that industrial 
production does not respond to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Although the 
price indexes are gently reduced, the reduction only lasts 15 months. Figure 11 shows 
the response functions under a more flexible currency regime. Industrial production 
responds with a prolonged and moderate reduction to an upward shock of the interest 
rate. However, the price indexes soar, resulting in price puzzles for about 20 months 
following a tightening policy shock. 
Before the exchange rate reform, both the repo and benchmark lending rates were not 
effective in stimulating economic performance. When the central bank raised the 
lending rate, industrial production and price indexes show insignificant and 
short-lived responses, as shown in Figures 8 and 10. When the exchange rate is more 
relaxed, a mildly significant and long-lasting downward effect is observed on 
industrial production after a few months of the shock, implying a more effective 
policy for stimulating economic growth. Yet, interest rates also generate price puzzles 
for both consumer and producer price indexes. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
market-based monetary policy does not show any sign of improvement given a more 
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flexible exchange rate policy. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
5.3. Estimation of FAVAR with monetary factor as instrument 
Third, we assess the effect of a change in market-based monetary stance by the PBC 
on the real economy. Because monetary and financial markets have not been fully 
liberalized, the transmission channels of the policy instruments are not as efficient as 
those in developed countries. The PBC has to rely on a number of policy instruments 
simultaneously to influence the economy. We consider 15 market-based measures, 
directly or indirectly managed by the PBC as potential monetary ins t ruments . We 
extract a policy factor from these 15 data series by maximum likelihood estimation. 
Table 12 shows that this factor is positively related to interest rates. The movement of 
this policy factor, as depicted in Figure 13, resembles those of the repo and 
benchmark lending rates. As a result, an upward shock of this factor can be interpreted 
as a tightening monetary stance. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
[Insert Figure 13 here] 
Figure 14 displays the impulse response functions from an upward shock of the policy 
19 These series include rediscount rate, repo rate (7 days, 1 month, and 3 months), benchmark lending 
rate (6 months and 1 year), central bank lending rate (20 days and 3 months), inter-bank interest rate (7 
days, 30 days, 90 days), interest rate on required reserve and excess reserve, saving rate, and time 
deposit rate (1 year). All these 18 series are seasonally adjusted and stationary. 
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factor before the exchange rate reform. When the central bank takes on a 
contractionary monetary stance, the negative effect on industrial production and price 
indexes are small but significant. These notable responses suggest that a combination 
of market-based instruments is more effective than a single instrument, such as the 
repo or benchmark rates. Figure 15 presents the impulse responses generated from 
FAVAR between September 2002 and February 2010. Not surprisingly, a downward 
and persistent pressure on industrial production builds up a few months after the onset 
of contractionary policy. Nonetheless, the price puzzle in consumer price index 
20 
emerges and prevails for nearly 20 months . 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
[Insert Figure 15 here] 
5.4. Estimation of FAVAR with total loan as instrument 
Other than market-based instruments, the PBC also employs non-market-based 
instruments to prop up the economy and contain the price level. The total loan, which 
is affected by both interest rates and administrative measures, is a principal indicator 
for the general monetary stance of the central bank. The PBC can tighten bank 
lending by raising the interest rates or by window guidance. Figures 16 and 17 show 
the impulse responses of economic variables to a lowering of the growth rate of total 
loans. Under the fixed exchange rate (Figure 16), a negative shock in total loan results 
in a rapid and persistent decline in industrial production. The price indexes are also 
lowered a few months after the monetary policy is tightened. When the exchange rate 
20 Additionally, we also do estimation with a factor which is constructed from the principal component 
of repo, benchmark lending rate, total loan and M2. The impulse response functions from this 
estimation resemble the results presented in Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
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is more flexible, a smaller total loan also considerably reduces industrial production 
and the consumer price index. These results reveal that the control of total loan is 
highly effective in regulating the economy. 
[Insert Figure 16 here] 
[Insert Figure 17 here] 
5.5. Estimation of FAVAR with M2 as instrument 
For the last model, we estimate the impulse response functions of industrial 
production and inflation for a downward shock in the growth rate of M2. Figure 18 
shows that under the pegged exchange rate regime, M2 shock initiates mild response 
from industrial production and the consumer price index. Thus, an increase in money 
supply stimulates real economic activities and raises general price levels. The 
influence of M2 on the economy has also been explicit, although less significant, after 
the exchange rate reform. Figure 19 shows that an increase in the growth rate of M2 
boosts industrial production and the consumer price index, but the effects die out 
about 15 months after the shock. 
Compared with the estimation results of the repo and benchmark rates, the growth rate 
of total loan and money supply are more successful in managing real economic 
activity and price level. As explained in Sections 2.2C and 2.2D, total loan and M2 
can be adjusted either by varying the interest rates or by window guidance. Neither 
the repo nor the benchmark rate, however, is shown to have a significant effect on M2, 
as depicted in Figures 8 and 10, implying that window guidance is the apparent 
driving force of changes in money supply. 
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[Insert Figure 18 here] 
[Insert Figure 19 here] 
5.6. Policy discussion 
In the estimation exercise above, we shed light on policy implications in two 
dimensions一the effectiveness of market-based and non-market-based instruments, 
and the effectiveness of instruments under a fixed or more flexible exchange rate 
regime. By comparing the results of different policy instruments, we show that the 
growth rate of total loan and money supply are more effective than interest-rate based 
monetary instruments in regulating the economy. When quantity of loan or broad 
money supply grows at a higher rate, industrial production and consumer price index 
rise immediately after the shock. Nevertheless, the real economy and price level 
respond with a longer lag and at a less significant amount to the shocks of repo and 
benchmark rates. This shows that the central bank could not solely rely on the use of 
interest rates to fine-tune the economy. Window guidance and regulatory adjustment 
are still crucial to effective monetary policy implementation. 
Our results also suggest that market-based policies have generally mild effects on 
industrial production and price level. There are several explanations for this. The first 
is the high level of excess reserve in the banking industry (Green, 2005). The high 
excess reserve ratio, about 4 percent from 2005-2007^' , absorbs much of the 
influence of the monetary policies. Second, the partially liberalized money market 
also restrains the capacity of market-based policies. Although numerous interest rate 
In the United States, the excess reserves are usually less than 2 percent of the deposit. 
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liberalization reforms have been implemented in the past decades, the ceiling on 
deposit rates and floor on lending rates are still in place, constraining the capacity for 
effective monetary policy. 
In addition, the policy factor that tracks the monetary stance for market-based policies 
has a more pronounced effect on the economy than do other monetary instruments 
before the exchange rate reform in 2005. This suggests that a wide range of 
market-based monetary instruments is more effective in managing the economy 
compared with a single interest rate adjustment. 
With regard to the change in exchange rate regimes, our estimation results are less 
explicit. The Renminbi is fixed against the US dollar before 2005; thus, the Chinese 
central bank could hardly set its monetary policy independent of its American 
counterpart. Since the exchange rate reform in 2005, the Renminbi has appreciated 
significantly against the US dollar. When the PBC carries out market-based tightening 
policies, industrial production displays a more significant decline under a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, price indexes rise amid a monetary 
tightening condition in the second subsample. There are several reasons for the 
emergence of price puzzles in the estimation. First, the Renminbi has been effectively 
repegged to the US dollar since 2008. This highly restricts the sample size for 
estimation in this paper. Furthermore, the PBC still relies heavily on window guidance 
as a principal monetary instrument, especially after the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis. The emergence of price puzzles given a shock from the market-based 




This paper improves the conventional VAR model by including factor variables to 
obtain a better understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism in China. 
Interest rates and market-based monetary policies, which have little impact on the real 
economy and price level under the fixed exchange rate regime, appear to be slightly 
more effective in industrial production when the exchange rate tends to be more 
market-determined. We also track the market-based monetary stance of the PBC by 
summarizing 15 policy variables in one policy factor. This policy factor is found to be 
more effective than any individual policy instrument. 
We also show that non-market-based measures at the disposal of the central bank are 
quite effective. This is because the central bank can control total financial loans as 
well as the broad money supply with higher flexibility compared with interest rates, 
which are highly restricted due to a rigid currency regime. Our results suggest that 
China should continue to carry out effective monetary policy through 
non-market-based measures under the rigid exchange rate system. 
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Figure 2: Benchmark Lending Rate (1 year) 
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Figure 3 ： Percentage Change of Financial Institution Loans (Year-on-year) 
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Figure 4: Percentage Change of Money Supply M2 (Year-on-year) 
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Figure 6: Annual growth rate of Industrial Production 
35 




1 � M S / IVI W 
5 1 
Q 1 J ™ 1 1 I ! I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 — 
， f v n v o 卜 o o o s o — c N c o � � o v o r - " O O O N O C N a N a N O N O N a N O O O o o o o o o O ' — C N O N O N C T N O N O N O O O O O O O O O O O 
-5 T-
Source: CEIC Database 
41 
Figure 7: Annual inflation rate (Consumer Price Index) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Table 12: The Factor Loadings of the representative factor 
Data Series Loadings Data Series Loadings 
BENCHMARK LENDING RATE (6M) 0 . 8 7 6 INTERBANK RATE (7D) 0 . 5 3 0 
BENCHMARK LENDING RATE (LY) 0 . 9 1 6 INTERBANK RATE (30D) 0 . 5 2 0 
CENTRAL BANK LENDING RATE (20D) 0 . 5 6 6 INTERBANK RATE (90D) 0 . 4 1 5 
CENTRAL BANK LENDING RATE (3M) 0 . 5 6 3 REPO RATE (7D) 0 . 5 3 7 
SAVING RATE 0 . 3 5 9 REPO RATE ( I M ) 0 . 5 6 1 
TIME DEPOSIT RATE (LY) 0 . 7 9 9 REPO RATE (3M) 0 . 6 1 0 
REDISCOUNT RATE 0 . 5 5 6 REQUIRED RESERVE RATE 0 . 3 2 8 
EXCESS RESERVE INTEREST RATE 0 . 1 5 3 
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Figure 13: The policy factor for general monetary stance 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
Estimated by principal components with two-step bootstrap (2002M9-2010M2) 
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Figure 11 ： Impulse response from FAVAR with three factors and benchmark rate 
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Appendix II: 
The time series data are all taken from CEIC Database. All of the series are monthly 
data from January 1998 to August 2009. Each of the series is labeled as either fast or 
slow. The transformation code: 1 - No transformation and 5 - First Difference of 
Logarithm. The seasonally adjusted: SA — Seasonally adjusted by Census X-12, 
NSA - Not seasonally adjusted. 
NO. CATEGORY ITEM FAST/SLOW S A T C 
1 REAL ACTIVITIES INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX: % CHANGE Y 1 
2 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: SALT SLOW Y 5 
3 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CANNED FOOD SLOW Y 5 
4 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CLOTH SLOW Y 5 
5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: HOUSEHOLD REFRIGERATOR SLOW Y 5 
6 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: AUTOMOBILES SLOW Y 5 
7 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MOTOR CYCLES SLOW Y 5 
8 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: AIR CONDITIONER SLOW Y 5 
9 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: TELEVISION SETS: COLOUR SLOW Y 5 
10 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CAMERA SLOW Y 5 
11 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MICRO COMPUTER SLOW Y 5 
12 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: PLASTIC PRODUCTS ( P P ) SLOW Y 5 
13 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CEMENT SLOW Y 5 
14 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: STEEL SLOW Y 5 
15 PRODUCTION OF PRIMARY ENERGY: C O A L SLOW Y 5 
16 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: COKE SLOW Y 5 
17 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: RUBBER TYRE SLOW Y 5 
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18 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: PROCESSED CRUDE OIL SLOW Y 5 
19 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: DIESEL OIL SLOW Y 5 
2 0 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: BICYCLES SLOW Y 5 
21 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: SEWING MACHINES SLOW Y 5 
2 2 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: HI FI SLOW Y 5 
2 3 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: HOUSEHOLD WASHING MACHINES SLOW Y 5 
2 4 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: SUGAR SLOW Y 5 
25 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: SYNTHETIC DETERGENTS SLOW Y 5 
2 6 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: KEROSENE SLOW Y 5 
2 7 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: SULPHURIC ACID SLOW Y 5 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CHEMICAL FERTILIZER(100% 
2 8 SLOW Y 5 
PURITY) 
2 9 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: PLATED GLASS SLOW Y 5 
3 0 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: FREIGHT WAGONS SLOW Y 5 
31 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CLOTH: PURE COTTON SLOW Y 5 
3 2 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CIVIL STEEL SHIPS SLOW Y 5 
3 3 INDUSTRIAL SALES SLOW Y 5 
3 4 INDUSTRIAL SALES: HEAVY INDUSTRY SLOW Y 5 
3 5 PRICE INDEX CONSUMER PRICE INDEX SLOW Y 1 
3 6 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: FOOD SLOW Y 1 
3 7 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: FOOD: GRAIN SLOW Y 1 
3 8 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: CLOTHING SLOW Y 1 
3 9 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: RESIDENCE SLOW Y 1 
4 0 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: MEDICINES AND MEDICAL SLOW Y 1 
4 1 RETAIL PRICE INDEX SLOW Y 1 
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4 2 RETAIL PRICE INDEX: FOOD SLOW Y 5 
4 3 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS SLOW Y 1 
4 4 PPI: IP: CONSUMER GOODS SLOW Y 1 
4 5 PURCHASING PI: RAW MATERIALS ( R M ) : TOTAL SLOW Y 1 
4 6 PURCHASING PI: R M : FUELS AND POWER SLOW Y 1 
4 7 INVESTMENT FIXED ASSETS INVESTMENT: YTD SLOW Y 1 
4 8 FDI: UTILIZED: YTD: TOTAL SLOW Y 1 
4 9 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT: YTD: TOTAL SLOW Y 1 
5 0 REAL ESTATE INV: YTD: RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS SLOW Y 1 
51 GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT REVENUE SLOW Y 1 
5 2 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE SLOW Y 1 
5 3 RETAIL SALES RETAIL SALES OF CONSUMER GOODS: TOTAL SLOW Y 1 
5 4 INTERNATIONAL TRADE EXPORTS FOB SLOW Y 5 
5 5 EXPORTS: EUROPE SLOW Y 5 
5 6 EXPORTS: U S A SLOW Y 5 
5 7 EXPORTS: A S E A N SLOW Y 5 
5 8 IMPORTS CIF SLOW Y 5 
5 9 IMPORTS: EUROPE SLOW Y 5 
6 0 IMPORTS: UNITED STATES SLOW Y 5 
61 IMPORTS: A S E A N SLOW Y 5 
6 2 INTEREST RATE POLICY RATE: MONTH END: REDISCOUNT FAST N 1 
6 3 SAVINGS DEPOSITS RATE FAST N 1 
6 4 TIME DEPOSITS RATE: 1 YEAR FAST N 1 
6 5 CENTRAL BANK BASE INTEREST RATE: LESS THAN 2 0 DAYS FAST N 1 
6 6 CENTRAL BANK BASE INTEREST RATE: 3 MONTHS OR LESS FAST N 1 
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6 7 BASE LENDING RATE: WORKING CAPITAL: 6 MONTHS FAST N 1 
6 8 BASE LENDING RATE: WORKING CAPITAL: 1 YEAR FAST N 1 
6 9 CENTRAL BANK BASE INTEREST RATE: REQUIRED RESERVE FAST N 1 
7 0 CENTRAL BANK BASE INTEREST RATE: EXCESS RESERVE FAST N 1 
National Interbank Offered Rate: Weighted Avg: 
71 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 7 Days 
National Interbank Offered Rate: Weighted Avg: 
72 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 30 Days 
National Interbank Offered Rate: Weighted Avg: 
73 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 90 Days 
National Interbank Bond Repurchase: WA Rate: 
74 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 7 Day 
National Interbank Bond Repurchase: WA Rate: 
75 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 1 Month 
National Interbank Bond Repurchase: WA Rate: 
76 Fast N 1 
NIBFC: 3 Month 
7 7 MONEY SUPPLY MONEY SUPPLY MO FAST Y 1 
7 8 MONEY SUPPLY ML FAST Y 1 
7 9 MONEY SUPPLY M 2 FAST Y 1 
8 0 QUASI MONEY FAST Y 1 
81 SAVING DEPOSITS FAST Y 1 
8 2 FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEPOSITS FAST Y 1 
8 3 FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LOANS FAST Y 1 
8 4 FOREIGN RESERVES FAST Y 1 
8 5 FINANCIAL MARKET INDEX: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE: COMPOSITE FAST N 5 
8 6 INDEX: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE: A SHARE FAST N 5 
8 7 INDEX: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE: B SHARE FAST N 5 
8 8 INDEX: SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE: COMPOSITE FAST N 5 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: WEIGHTED AVG: C F E T S : R M B 
8 9 EXCHANGE RATE FAST N 5 
to US Dollar 
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Foreign Exchange Rate: Weighted Avg: CFETS: RMB 
90 Fast N 5 
to Japanese Yen 
91 CONSUMER INDEX CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX SLOW N 1 
9 2 CONSUMER EXPECTATION INDEX SLOW N 1 
9 3 CONSUMER SATISFACTORY INDEX SLOW N 1 
9 4 U S DATA M 2 MONEY STOCK ( N S A ) SLOW Y 5 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS AT ALL COMMERCIAL 
9 5 SLOW Y 1 
BANKS 
9 6 3-MONTH TREASURY BILL: SECONDARY MARKET RATE SLOW N 1 
9 7 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: ALL COMMODITIES SLOW Y 1 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS: ALL 
9 8 SLOW Y 1 
ITEMS 
9 9 DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME SLOW Y 1 
1 0 0 PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES SLOW Y 1 
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Chapter 2 
The Time-Varying Volatility of Chinese Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
Abstract: 
This paper identifies the factors that shift the macroeconomic fluctuations in China 
since its reform in 1978. We utilize the frequency domain and vector autoregression 
analyses to evaluate three hypotheses on the moderation of macroeconomy. Our result 
indicates that “Good Luck" hypothesis, which suggests milder exogenous shocks 
hitting the economy, is the most dominant factor dampening economic fluctuations, 
whereas better monetary policy and better business practices have marginal and no 
impact, respectively, in smoothing the economy. 
KEYWORDS: Economic Moderation, Business Cycles, Frequency Domain 
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1. Introduction 
The striking reduction of output volatility in most industrial economies since the 
middle of 1980s, also known as "Great Moderation", has attracted increasing attention 
in recent years. Starting with the work of McConnell et al. (2000), a number of 
researches have been devoted to studying the sources of the reduction in the 
macroeconomic volatilities. However, what has driven this phenomenon remains 
debated. Several competing explanations have been advanced for this great 
moderation. Clarida, et al., (2000), and Boivin et al. (2006) has claimed that the good 
policies, such as the improved monetary policy, have tamed the business cycle. While, 
McConnell et al. (2000) and Kahn et al. (2002) suggest that the improved business 
cycle practice, including inventory management, accounts for a significant fraction of 
the reduction in output volatility. Other underlying factors for the moderation in 
business cycle volatility, such as good luck?�，financial innovation and global 
integration^"^ have also been extensively examined. Recently, Justiniano and Primiceri 
(2008) show that investment-specific technology shock accounts for most of the sharp 
decline in volatility. 
Empirical studies on the time-varying fluctuations mentioned above abound, while 
little is known outside of developed countries. Our paper adds to the existing literature 
by analyzing the time-varying volatility of macroeconomic fluctuations in China, the 
largest transition economy that plays an increasing role in the world economy. Despite 
the persistently high growth rate of China since 1978, several investigations have 
“ T h e decline in output volatility may simply reflect the milder shocks impacting the economy 
(Simon, 2000, Stock and Watson, 2002; Ahmed, et al. 2004). 
Dynan et al. (2006) find evidence that the financial innovation is a likely contributor to the 
mid-1980s stabilization. 
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noticed that the Chinese economy has been markedly more stable since the mid-1990s 
(Brandt and Zhu, 2000 and 2001; He et al. 2009). However, what has contributed to 
this moderation in economic activities remains unknown. 
The case of China is interesting for several reasons. First, unlike its western 
counterparts, the Chinese economy has developed with a gradual reform toward a 
market economy. Especially in the last decades, China's monetary policy 
implementation and financial market have undergone substantial development. A 
more efficient monetary policy could smooth business cycle fluctuations. Second, 
numerous previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized and many 
privately owned firms have emerged since the mid-1990s. Whether or not structural 
change due to a market economy reform has led to volatility reduction remains an 
open question. Finally, soaring economic growth with economic stability is the target 
of any developing economy. The case of China could provide valuable policy 
implications for other developing countries. 
The objective of this paper is to test the existence of time-varying macroeconomic 
fluctuations of the Chinese economy since the mid-1990s. Following Ahmed et al. 
(2004)，we first use the GDP growth spectrum to decompose its variance by different 
frequency bands. The frequency domain method allows us to associate the volatility 
shifts with each possible moderation explanation.^^ A Vector Autoregression VAR 
analysis is also conducted to serve as a robustness check to determine which factors 
have contributed to the shift in volatility change. 
“ A h m e d et al. (2004) suggest that the spectrum shift at business-cycle frequencies reflect the change 
in monetary policy while relevant changes in business practices are more likely to be associated with 
relatively high frequencies. Finally, the shifts of innovation shock would generate a proportional 
decline in the spectrum at all frequencies. 
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We find that the moderation is mostly due to milder shocks hitting the economy since 
1995. The improvement in monetary policy implementation and better business 
practice due to the privatization of SOEs do not have significant impacts on volatility 
reduction. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents evidence and explanations of the 
moderation of macroeconomic volatility in China. Sections 3 and 4 employ 
frequency-domain analysis and a standard VAR model to address the cause of the 
reduction in fluctuations, respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Overview of Chinese Economic Performance 
2.1. Volatility of the Chinese Macro-economy 
Several investigations have found that the Chinese economy had highly cyclical 
patterns before 1994^^ Since the mid-1990s, however, fluctuations in the Chinese 
economy have undergone a substantial reduction (Brandt and Zhu 2000 and 2001; He 
et al. 2009). 
Figures 1 and 2 present the real GDP growth rate and the consumer price index of 
China, respectively, since 1979. Note that both output growth rate and consumer price 
index show different patterns after the mid-1990s. Figure 1 shows that real GDP 
26 Though there is no consensus on when the moderation begins, previous literatures (Wu, 2003) 
usually refer 1994 or 1995 as the end of huge economic fluctuation since the economic reform in 1979. 
In this study, we choose the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 as the dividing year of volatility 
shift. 
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growth rate fluctuates at around 10 percent, with a range of 16 percent in 1985 to zero 
growth in 1989. The growth rate resurges to 14 percent in 1994. Since then, however, 
the output growth rate has remained relatively stable, moving within a band of 6.2 and 
13.8 percent. The consumer price index also shows huge fluctuations before 1994， 
with the bottom at 1 percent in 1990Q3 and the peak at 25 percent in 1994Q4. After 
the high inflation period in the early 1990s, the inflation rate finally turns negative, 
ranging from -1 percent to -6 percent for most of the time since 1994. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Such excessive volatility could be associated with cycles of relaxation and tightening 
of economic policy by the Chinese government. Since the price of factor inputs was 
suppressed before the reform, many provinces sped up investment in the heavy 
industry when granted with more autonomy to produce in the late 1970s. As the 
supply of factor inputs was limited, the input cost and the consumer price index 
soared within a short space of time. Table 3 shows that the average inflation rate for 
consumer products was above 8 percent and that grain price even grew at 12 percent 
annually before 1994. This high inflation may have inflicted social unrest, and the 
government had to cool down the economy by taking back decision-making power 
from the provinces. With a lack of incentive to invest, the economy slowed down and 
the government needed to relax its grip on the economy again. As the policy cycle 
repeated itself before 1994, the economy fluctuated violently. As shown in Table 4’ 
the standard deviations of the real GDP growth rate and consumer price index 
inflation rate were 4 percent and 7 percent, respectively, between 1979 and 1994， 
which are higher than those in the second period. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
2.2. Tests of Parameter Stability 
To complement the ocular evidence shown in the above figures, we would detect the 
existence of parameter stability by Nyblom's L test as described by Bruce Hansen 
(1992). To perform the test^^, we model the real GDP growth rate and the consumer 
price index as AR(1) processes, such that we could check the existence of a 
breakpoint for the constant term, autoregressive coefficient and the variance. The tests 
of these two variables are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 5 shows the Nyblom's L test for stability of real GDP growth rate. From the 
asymptotic critical values for a 10 percent test in Hansen (1992)，we fail to reject the 
stability of both the constant term and autoregressive coefficient. Nevertheless, we 
could reject the stability of the variance as test statistics exceeds the critical values. 
Table 6 presents the Nyblom's L test for stability of consumer price index. Similarly, 
we could not reject the stability of the variance. These test results suggest the 
existence of variance instability for both real GDP growth rate and consumer price 
index between 1979Q1 and 2009Q4. 
27 The test was computed in Matlab using the code from Hansen (1992). 
66 
To further our analysis of variance stability and to shed light on when the moderation 
starts, we perform a CUSUM of square test on the residuals. The CUSUM of squares 
test (Brown et al., 1975) is based on the cumulative sum of the squared 
one-step-ahead forecast error from recursive estimation. We plot the cumulative sum 
along with the 5 percent critical lines. Movement outside the critical lines suggests 
variance instability. To perform the CUSUM of squares tests, we need to regress the 
variable (i.e. real GDP growth rate and consumer price index in this study) on a 
constant and a linear time trend. Figures 7 and 8 report the results of CUSUM of 
squares tests for the real GDP growth rate and the consumer price index respectively. 
In Figure 7, the CUSUM of squares exceeds the 5 percent critical lines for a 13 year 
span from 1990 to 2003，which implies an extended period of variance instability. 
Despite such a long period of variance stability for real economic activities, we could 
identify that the CUSUM of squares deviates most from the variance stability area in 
around 1994 and 1995. Figure 8 suggests that the CUSUM of squares goes beyond the 
critical value in late 1980s and early 2000s while it is just within the boundary 
between 1994 and 1995. Despite falling short of providing an unambiguous support, 
our estimation results suggest that the period between 1994 and 1995 observe 
variance instabilities in real GDP growth rate and consumer price index in China. This 
is consistent with the ocular and anecdotal evidence above and we would proceed to 
further analysis using 1995 as the beginning year of economic moderation. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
2.3 Hypothesis of Economic Moderation 
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Despite the continued high growth rate, the volatilities of many variables have been 
moderated since the mid-1990s as presented in the tests above. Table 4 shows that the 
standard deviation of real GDP growth rate, the consumer price index, and the money 
supply growth rate significantly dropped in the second period. The standard deviation 
of grain price is also mildly lower. This sudden moderation of economic volatility can 
be attributed to three distinct factors, namely, better policy, better practice, and "Good 
luck." 
Firstly, the financial reform, such as interest rate liberalization, can help reduce 
economic fluctuations. Before 1994，interest rates were held fixed and pushed down 
to support the financial needs of SOEs. When the government adopts an expansionary 
policy, the investment and demand for funding usually go up. If interest rates are not 
market-determined, the rates cannot rise to lower investments and increase savings, 
therefore leading to an overheating economy and a high inflation level. After 1994, 
the Chinese government carried out a series of financial and banking reforms. To 
develop indirect monetary tools, the central bank started rediscounting business and 
open market operations in 1995 and 1996, respectively. The interbank interest rate 
system was established in 1996 and the credit quota system was scrapped in 1998. 
Since 1998，most interest rates have been gradually liberalized to enhance the interest 
rate transmission channel of the economy. With a more effective monetary policy, the 
central bank could stabilize the currency value and promote economic growth in a 
more efficient manner. A more market-driven banking system could also allocate 
capital more efficiently. The huge fluctuation between 1979 and 1994 could thus be 
smoothed. 
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Secondly, the privatization of SOEs and the emergence of private enterprises may 
contribute to the moderation of economic fluctuations. Before the economic reform, 
the SOEs dominated economic production and were the only sources of investment. 
As the managements of SOEs have no control over production decision, they have no 
incentive to maximize profits by streamlining the production process. When the 
government stimulates the economy by relaxing the control over SOEs, they will 
respond by raising investment, which fosters economic growth and inflation at the 
same time. Nevertheless, a number of market reforms since 1994 started the 
privatization of large SOEs in China. For instance, the State Council of China chose 
100 SOEs to examine the practice of privatization in 1994. Moreover, the number of 
private enterprises has increased since the early reform period. Due to these reforms, 
the more market-driven economic structure might dampen economic fluctuation. 
On the one hand, private investment would be directed more efficiently to the most 
profitable projects and would be less susceptible to government interference. This 
might lower the economic volatility induced by the policy change. On the other hand, 
private enterprises, being profit maximizers, would optimize production procedures, 
such as inventory management, to make the highest earnings possible. As the firms 
become more production-efficient, they could weather economic fluctuations in a 
better way and economic volatility could be reduced. 
Finally, it is also possible that the general fall in volatility of several key variables is 
entirely due to “Good Luck." The “Good Luck" hypothesis states that the moderation 
of economic performance is entirely due to the reduction of the variance of shocks 
hitting the Chinese economy. In contrast, the financial reform and the privatization of 
SOEs would change the structure of the economy. With this hypothesis, the variance 
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of some unexplained and exogenous shock may account for the largest share of 
volatility reduction. 
3. Frequency Domain Analysis 
3.1 Estimation Framework 
In this section, frequency domain analysis is employed to decompose a number of key 
economic variables of the Chinese economy into a sum of sine and cosine 
components with different frequencies and amplitudes. This decomposition enables 
investigation of the variability of different frequency components. This decomposition 
is possible because any covariance-stationary process {x, has both a 
time-domain representation and a frequency domain representation, and any feature of 
the data can be equivalently described by the two representations (Hamilton, 1994). 
Following the specification of King and Watson (1996)，the covariance-stationary 
variable can be written as 
X, = ^x,{oJ>)dco ⑴， 
•0 
=r [a{co) cosicot) + bio) sm(cot)Yco 
•0 
where a{co) and b{co) are uncorrelated random variables with mean zero and 
common variance 2s^ {co). Therefore, the variance could be decomposed as 
var(x,) = 2 r^^{co)dco ⑵， 
•0 
where the population spectrum “ 劝 is the contribution to variance at frequency 
28 The population spectrum could be expressed as a function of the j-th autocovariance of the series 
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Accordingly, for any given frequency rangea<\(o\<b, the variance attributed to these 
frequencies is 2 ts^{co)dco. Therefore, the spectrum amplitude at frequency co 
•h 
2n 
indicates the contribution to the total variance at period ——.Apart from the spectrum 
CO 
above, we also inspect the normalized spectrum, which gives the fraction of variance 
attributable to a certain frequency o) . The normalized spectrum is defined as 
m(o~) = s与 (3). 
cr" 
Based on the conventional setting, the whole spectrum can be separated into three 
frequency bands, namely, low frequency, business cycle frequency and high 
f r e q u e n c y ^ 9 x h e business cycle is for a period between 6 quarters and 32 quarters]�. 
Any cycle longer than 32 quarters will be in the low-frequency range, and cycles 
shorter than 6 quarters will be classified as high frequency^'. 
By decomposing the spectrum into three frequency bands, we can evaluate the 
sources of moderation by inspecting the volatility decline in different bands. First, as 
the improved monetary policy acts to dampen business cycles, the spectrum in 
business cycle frequencies should decline disproportionately in the second sample 
period. Second, the privatization of SOEs and the emergence of private firms should 
{A-,}二4，which is •S“<Y) = 丄 Z R；[COS(FTY)-/sin(6Y)]. Conversely, we could also define the j-th 
� I K J=-CO 
autocovariance in terms of the population spectrum, which is YJ do). By setting the j=0, 
the variance of the series is Var{x) 二 = J-�{co)d(o = _co (Hamilton, 1994). 
29 Low, business cycles and high frequency bands could be referred as long run, business cycle and 
short run components of variance. 
Accordingly, the band of business cycle could be defined as a frequency band between 0.196 and 
1.047. 
31 This classification is generally based on the previous studies on the economic volatility. For instance, 
Baxter and King (1999) suggest that the business cycle frequency should correspond to cycles of 6 to 
32 quarters. 
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enhance production productivity, inventory management, and investment efficiency. 
These improvements are more likely to smooth output on a quarter-by-quarter basis. 
For instance, a better inventory system can match the output to final sales more 
efficiently, leading to a reduction of economic fluctuations primarily in the 
high-frequency band. Finally, under the "Good Luck" hypothesis, the structure of the 
economy has no change and the plunge in volatilities is attributed to a reduced 
variance of exogenous shock. This should produce a proportional decline in the 
spectrum of all frequencies. By inspecting the reduction in different frequency bands, 
the source of moderation in the Chinese economy in the post-1995 period can be 
identified. 
3.2 Estimation Results 
We report the primary and normalized spectra for real GDP growth rate and the 
consumer price index in Figures 9 to These two indicators are chosen because 
they are the best to represent the economic performance of and the price level in an 
economy. In each case, we assume that a structural break exists at the end of 1994 and 
at the start of 1995, such that the volatilities are moderated since 1995. 
3.2.1. Spectrum of Real GDP Growth Rate (RGDP) 
Figure 9 presents the spectrum of real GDP growth rate of the 1979Q1-1994Q4 and 
1995Q1-2009Q4 periods. In this figure, both spectra display the "typical" shape of an 
economic variable (Granger, 1966), peaking at low frequency and gradually declining 
32 For each of the figures, the horizontal axis denotes the frequency 0) • The entire spectrum is divided 
into three distinct frequency ranges: low, business cycle and high. 
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when it moves toward the business cycle frequency. These skewed shapes indicate 
that longer-term fluctuations (i.e., fluctuations in the lower frequency bands) 
contribute most to the variance of real GDP growth rate. Also, by comparing the two 
spectra, we could conclude that most of the reduction in variance of real GDP growth 
comes from the business cycle and low frequency; there is scant reduction in spectra 
in the high frequency. Thus, the results infer that the improved monetary policy 
should have helped moderating the economic volatility by taming the business cycles 
while the contribution from better business practice seems negligible. 
In addition, we have estimated the normalized spectrum of real GDP growth, which is 
presented in Figure 10. Note from Figure 10 that the spectra of the first and second 
sample period are largely similar in shapes. Therefore, the decline in output variability 
seems to be evenly distributed across various frequencies, instead of concentrated at 
certain frequency band. The similarity suggests that the structure of the economy did 
not have a gigantic change and is consistent with the "Good Luck" hypothesis. The 
moderation, therefore, could also be accounted for by shrinkage of innovation 
variance. 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
3.2.2. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
The spectra of consumer price index (Figure 11) also follow the typical decreasing 
patterns in both sample periods, with peaks at lower frequencies. Similar to Figure 9, 
the spectrum of the second sample is much lower than that of the first sample in both 
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low and business cycle frequencies. This finding confirms that price fluctuation was 
greatly moderated after 1995 and also suggests that the moderation is more likely to 
be due to a better monetary policy than an improved business practice. 
Figure 12, in addition, shows that the normalized spectra of the two samples are quite 
similar, despite a slight shift to the low frequency band in the second sample. This 
result suggests that the reduction in innovation variance is also consistent with the 
"Good Luck" hypothesis, which stipulates a general and proportional decline in 
variance. 
Moreover, compared with that of real GDP growth rate in Figure 10，the spectra of 
CPI in Figure 12 have a greater proportion of variance in the low frequency band, 
implying that the price adjustment is slower than that of the economic output. This 
raises concern for price stickiness. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
3.2.3. Conclusion of Frequency Domain Analysis 
The volatilities of real GDP growth rate and consumer price index have declined since 
the mid-1990s. Despite the emergence of private enterprises and privatization of the 
state-owned enterprises since the mid-1990s, the spectra of both GDP growth and 
inflation do not observe significant reduction in the high frequency band. On the other 
hand, the monetary policy, which has been improved by interest rate liberalizations 
and deeper financial development, is shown to be an important contributor to the 
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economic moderation. The amplitudes of the spectra in the business cycle frequency 
band in both economic indicators have been reduced significantly. 
Apart from a better monetary policy, we also find evidence consistent with the "Good 
Luck" hypothesis, suggesting that a reduction in variance of the exogenous shocks 
hitting the economy. From the figures above, we found similar normalized spectra for 
the two sample period for each of the two variables. The lack of major structural 
change for the normalized spectra also points to the "Good Luck" hypothesis. 
4. Vector Autoregression Analysis 
Using Frequency Domain Analysis, we find compelling evidence that the milder 
shocks contribute most to volatility reduction. However, evidence that improved 
monetary policy may help lower volatility is also found. To complement the 
frequency domain analysis, we extend our analysis to the time domain in a 
multivariate framework. By using a standard Vector Autoregression (VAR), we could 
keep track of the dynamic interactions and structures of several key variables. In 
particular, we focus on the role of monetary policy on moderating the economy in this 
section. 
The VAR model includes real GDP growth rate, consumer price index, grain price, 
and the percentage change of broad money supply in 1979Q1-2009Q4. Real GDP 
growth rate and consumer price index are the more representative variables for 
tracking general economic performance. Grain price is used as a proxy for commodity 
price in solving the price puzzle. The percentage change of broad money supply is the 
best available measure of the general monetary stance, as interest rates have become 
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more flexible only in recent decades. Under this econometric model, the impact of 
monetary policy on the economy in the two samples can be further investigated. 
4.1. Estimation Results 
If the better monetary policy is the principal contributor to the economic moderation, 
we should expect a more significant change for economic growth and inflation after a 
monetary shock hitting the economy. Figure 13 presents the impulse response 
functions for one unit of positive shock from the growth rate of money supply in the 
1979Q1-1994Q4 period. The growth rate of real GDP shows a slim increase at first 
but goes down after five quarters. On the other hand, the consumer price index 
increases significantly. Thus, an expansionary monetary policy has a positive impact 
on consumer price index but it has an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Figure 
14 shows the impulse response functions for one unit of money shock in the 
1995Q1-2009Q4 period. Similar to Figure 13, the consumer price index increases 
significantly. The increase in the real GDP growth rate, although slightly stronger and 
more persistent, is still not significant. 
By comparing the impulse response in the two samples, we could see the real GDP 
growth and inflation is mildly more responsive to the monetary shock in the second 
period. This suggests that the improved monetary policy may only have a partial 
contribution to the decline in economic volatility. 
[Insert Figure 13 here] 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
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In addition, we could find some evidence in support of the help from a better 
monetary policy to economic moderation in variance decomposition. Table 15 
presents a variance decomposition of real GDP growth rate for two sample periods. 
As shown in the upper panel, the money supply explains 41 percent of the variance in 
real GDP growth rate in the 1979Q1-1994Q4 period at a three-year horizon. 
Nevertheless, the money supply accounts for only 7 percent in the 1995Q1-2009Q4 
period at a three-year horizon. 
Table 16 displays a variance decomposition of the consumer price index for two 
sample periods. Similar to Table 15, the money supply explains a much higher 
percentage of variance of the consumer price index in the first period. Both 
decomposition results indicate that the monetary shocks decrease significantly for 
both decomposition of Real GDP growth rate and consumer price index. Such a 
significant drop in volatility is consistent with the hypothesis of an improved policy, 
which helps eliminate much of the fluctuations in the real economic activities and 
price level. In summary, the estimation results from the VAR analysis indicate the 
improved monetary policy has helped easing the volatility in the real GDP growth rate 
and the consumer price index. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
5. Conclusion 
Economic moderation is commonplace in advanced industrial economies since 1980s. 
The reduction in volatility has drawn much attention in recent years due to its 
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important implications for the general welfare of society and the policy formulation. 
In our study, we found that a number of ocular and anecdotal evidence in support of a 
general reduction in volatility for the real GDP growth rate as well as the consumer 
price index. Results from the Nyblom's L test and CUSUM of Squares tests show the 
existence of variance instability for the real economic activities. In particular, the 
evidence is indicative that the moderation started from mid-1990s. 
To analyze the source of economic moderation in China, we examine three possible 
explanations, better monetary policy, better business practice, and milder economic 
shocks, using the frequency domain and VAR analysis. Based on the frequency 
domain analysis, most of the variance reduction of real GDP growth rate and 
consumer price index are due to smaller shocks to the economy. Monetary policy only 
has marginal impacts on smoothing the volatility in business cycle frequency. A 
potentially better business practice, due to the privatization of SOEs and emergence of 
private enterprises, has no apparent effect on the high-frequency spectrum. 
To complement the frequency domain analysis, we employed a standard VAR model 
to further investigate the role of monetary policy in smoothing the economy. 
According to the estimation, the model provides some evidence in support of a mildly 
significant role of an improved monetary policy in moderation. 
In conclusion, our study suggests that the “Good Luck" hypothesis is the most 
plausible reason for the general reduction in volatility in China since the mid-1990s. 
The improved monetary policy has also partly contributed to the reduced economic 
fluctuations. Nevertheless, we find no evidence in support of a better business practice 
in facilitating the economic moderation. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix 1. - Data Description 
This paper employs quarterly data series dated from the first quarter of 1979 to the 
fourth quarter of 2009. The only quarterly data we obtained are the broad money 
supply from the CEIC and the Real GDP growth rate from Abeysinghe and Rajaguru 
(2004). As only annual data are available for most of the data series of interest, we 
used the Chow-Lin method (1971) for temporal disaggregation by related series from 
annual data into quarterly data. The data we used in this exercise are reported below: 
No. Data Series Source 
1 Real GDP Growth rate Abeysinghe and Rajaguru (2004) and CEIC 
2 Consumer Price Index China Statistical Yearbook, Authors' Calculation 
3 Grain Price Index China Statistical Yearbook, Authors' Calculation 
4 Broad Money Supply China Statistical Yearbook, Authors' Calculation 
5 Total Trade Value China Statistical Yearbook 
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Appendix 2 - Figures 
Figure 1. Real GDP Growth Rate 
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Figure 2. Consumer Price Index (Year-on-Year) 
3Q -i First Sample 1979:1-1994:4 ^ Sccond Sample: 1995:1-2009:4 " 
「 I l\ \ 
Mean=8.1% / / \ 
1 \ V J \ A 
5 - \ / / \ Mean=3% A / 
-5 -
85 
Table 3. Comparison of the Mean of Different Variables 
Mean Difference (II-I) T-test" 
I： 79Q1-94Q4 II: 95Q1-09Q4 p-value 
RGDP 9.9843 9.6766 -0.3077 0.5827 
CPI 8.1403 2.9804 -5.1599 0.0000 
Grain Price 11.9375 3.7543 -8.1832 0.0005 
Money Supply 25.9842 19.1477 -6.8365 0.0000 
；"Nul l Hypothesis: Period I = Period II; Alternative Hypothesis: Period I 丰 Period II 
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Table 4. Comparison of the Standard Deviation of Different Variables 
Standard Deviation Difference (II-I) T-test^ '* 
1:79Q1-94Q4 II: 95Q1-09Q4 p-value 
RGDP 4.0229 1.6426 -2.3803 0.0000 
CPI 7.1488 4.7932 -2.3555 0.0011 
Grain Price 13.6550 12.2983 -1.3567 0.1839 
Money Supply 7.0545 5.7054 -1.3490 0.0508 
34 Null Hypothesis: Period I = Period II; Alternative Hypothesis: Period I > Period II 
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Table 5: Nyblom's L test for Stability of real GDP Growth (1979Q1-2009Q4) 
Specification: y,= + + G，where y, is the real GDP growth rate 
Variable Estimate St. Error “ Critical Value (10%) 
/ / 1 . 4 4 4 5 0 . 6 1 2 7 0 . 0 4 2 9 0 . 3 5 3 
(P 0 . 8 5 6 7 0 . 0 6 5 0 0 . 0 3 5 2 0 . 3 5 3 
CR2 2 . 4 6 5 9 0 . 6 2 5 8 0 . 3 8 3 9 0 . 3 5 3 
JOINT L, 0 . 9 4 3 4 0 . 8 4 6 
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Table 6: Nyblom's L test for Stability of Consumer Price Index (1979Q1-2009Q4) 
Specification: N, = // + + E,，where TV, is the consumer price index 
Variable Estimate St. Error L^  Critical Value (10%) 
“ 4 . 2 0 7 6 3 . 3 2 0 4 0 . 2 0 4 3 0 . 3 5 3 
<T> 0 . 9 6 0 0 0 . 0 3 2 3 0 . 1 9 1 8 0 . 3 5 3 
O-' 3 . 6 2 0 2 0 . 6 1 1 9 0 . 7 6 1 6 0 . 3 5 3 
JOINT L^  0 . 9 9 4 7 0 . 8 4 6 
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Figure 7. CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test for Real GDP growth rate 
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Figure 8. CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test for consumer price index 
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1. Charts in Frequency Spectrum 
Figure 9. Spectrum of Real GDP Growth 
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Figure 10. Normalized Spectrum of Real GDP Growth 
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Figure 12: Normalized Spectrum of Consumer Price Index 
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Figure 13. Impulse Response Function to one unit Money Supply Shock^^ 
(Sample Period: 1979:1-1994:4) ^^  
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
Response of RGDP to MS Response of CPI to MS 
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Note: Dashed lines show two-standard-error confidence bounds 
The standard errors bands are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation for 100 repetitions for the 
impulse response functions presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12.. 
36 Variables (Abbreviation): Annual Real GDP Growth Rate (RGDP); Consumer Price Index (CPI); 
Percentage Change of Grain Price (Grain); Growth rate of Money Supply (MS) 
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Figure 14. Impulse Response Function to one unit Money Supply Shock 
(Sample Period: 1995:1-2009:4) 
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Table 15. Variance Decomposition ofVAR Model of Real GDP growth rate 
Sample Period: 1979Q1-1994Q4 
Quarters Percent of Forecast explained by 
AHEAD S .E . R G D P CPI G R A I N M S 
4 2.57 90.07 4.54 0.89 4.49 
(7.19) (5.30) (2.35) (4.09) 
8 2.94 77.50 5.03 4.28 13.17 
(10.71) (7.37) (5.97) (7.44) 
12 3.77 47.50 3.32 7.94 41.22 
(15.22) (7.56) (8.72) (14.63) 
Note: Cholesky Ordering: RGDP, CPI, GRAIN, MS. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Sample Period: 1995Q1-2009Q4 
Quarters 
AHEAD S .E . R G D P C P I G R A I N M S 
4 1.52 73.40 18.06 5.01 3.50 
(13.30) (10.56) (6.08) (3.66) 
8 1.95 46.24 36.70 10.29 6.75 
(17.34) (15.34) (9.45) (7.019) 
12 2.01 43.43 38.50 10.98 7.06 
(17.07) (15.12) (9.61) (7.82) 
Note: Cholesky Ordering: RGDP, CPI, GRAIN, MS. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table 16. Variance Decomposition of VAR Model of Consumer Price Index 
Sample Period: 1979Q1-1994Q4 
Quarters Percent of Forecast explained by 
AHEAD S .E . R G D P CPI G R A I N M S 
4 3.81 20.47 25.87 19.42 34.22 
(11.35) (8.79) (9.68) (10.68) 
8 6.02 11.73 11.80 17.83 58.61 
(12.58) (9.39) (12.83) (16.87) 
12 6.30 10.92 11.50 17.19 60.37 
(13.64) (10.01) (12.38) (16.78) 
Note: Cholesky Ordering: RGDP, CPI, GRAIN, MS. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Sample Period: 1995Q1-2009Q4 
Quarters Percent of Forecast explained by 
AHEAD S .E . R G D P CPI G R A I N M S 
4 1.68 54.01 21.91 3.19 20.87 
(10.89) (8.28) (6.50) (9.15) 
8 2.70 42.97 24.61 1.58 30.82 
(15.99) (11.94) (6.75) (11.80) 
12 3.11 36.49 34.24 1.51 27.74 
(17.07) (15.52) (7.21) (11.70) 
Note: Cholesky Ordering: RGDP, CPI, GRAIN, MS. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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